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1 Introduction 
1.1 What is abduction?  
Traditionally, Logic has focus on deduction. Its main objective has been to 
clarify when a given inference is valid, that is, when the conclusion is entailed by the 
premises. One of the pillars of this enterprise is the Aristotelian Analytics, where the 
syllogism is taken as the paradigm for reasoning. The modern notion of logical 
consequence, though is defined in a more abstract and formalised way, ratifies the 
privileged position of deduction as the centre of the logical universe.  
But there exist other kinds of inference. The philosopher C. S. Peirce (1839 - 
1914), distinguishes three kinds of reasoning: deduction, induction and abduction. 
Peirce, contrary to the logical tradition, considers that the most interesting kind of 
inference is abduction. Peirce characterizes abduction in this schematic way: 
The surprising fact, F, is observed; 
but if H were true, F would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true (CP 5.189, 1903).  
So abduction is the inference which formulates a hypothesis H that explains a 
surprising fact F. If we turn back to Aristotle, in the Prior Analytics he establishes not 
only the categorical syllogism, but also other inference patterns which change the 
order of the propositions. Those patterns, though non deductively valid, are very 
important in human reasoning. One of them is the apagoge. An example of Aristotle: 
Animals without bile live many years. 
But the man, the horse and the mule live many years. 
Hence, the man, the horse and the mule do not have bile.  
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The similarity between the Aristotelian apagoge and the Peircean abduction is 
not a matter of chance. In fact, Peirce himself admits the borrowing of concepts from 
Aristotle. But for Peirce, abduction is not only a kind of reasoning among others. 
Peirce thinks that abduction is the most interesting kind of inference because it is the 
only way of introducing new ideas (EP 2:216, 1903). 
Thanks to the Peircean works, abductive reasoning has become a central topic 
not only in Logic, but also in other disciplines as Linguistics, Epistemology, Artificial 
Intelligence and, of course, Philosophy of Science. 
1.2 Is abduction the logic of discovery?  
Philosophy of Science is, exactly, the discipline in which the importance of 
abduction is more discussed. It is usual the distinction between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification. The former is understood as the set of 
processes which lead to the formulation of a new theory, while the latter refers to the 
methods used in science to confront the hypothesis with the empirical evidence. P. 
Lipton (1991) defends that scientific discovery is achieved as an inference to the best 
explanation, so explanatory reasoning, and hence abduction, play a central role in the 
context of discovery. But other authors are critical with these ideas. 
S. Paavola (2004) collects the arguments that are commonly given against the 
characterisation of abduction as a logic of (scientific) discovery. The first of them is 
that in the Peircean formulation of abduction – given above – the only requirement for 
H is that it would make F true. Authors like P. Achinstein argue that this is too 
permissive, because it does not exclude some improbable or wild hypotheses if they 
would explain F. Other criticisms insist in the idea that abduction cannot be 
understood as a logic of discovery because the explanatory hypothesis H is already 
included in the premises, because prior to infer H we need to know that H would 
explain F. Then, as scientific discovery introduces new ideas in science, it cannot be 
the result of an abductive inference. 
To defend abduction as a logic of discovery, S. Paavola follows a distinction 
borrowed by J. Hintikka from game theory. It is the distinction between definitory and 
strategic rules. The former settle the legal moves in a game, whereas the latter are 
used to decide which is the most suitable rule among all the possible. Logic has been 
traditionally devoted to definitory rules of the calculi and has barely paid attention to 
the strategic rules which are able to lead to a good proof, in a strategic sense that goes 
beyond classical soundness. 
In line with this, J. Hintikka (1998) takes from T. Kapitan four theses which 
sum up the main characteristics of abduction: 
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Inferential Thesis. Abduction is, or includes, an inferential process or 
processes. 
Thesis of Purpose. The purpose of “scientific” abduction is both (i) to generate 
new hypotheses and (ii) to select hypotheses for further examination; hence, a central 
aim of scientific abduction is to “recommend a course of action”. 
Comprehension Thesis. Scientific abduction includes all the operations 
whereby theories are engendered. 
Autonomy Thesis. Abduction is, or embodies, reasoning that is distinct from, 
and irreducible to, either deduction or induction.  
We will come back to Kapitan theses. For now, it is enough to remark that 
there are reasons to accept abduction as a logic of discovery. But then, abduction must 
include some kind of strategic rules and satisfy the above theses which set up 
abduction as an autonomous inferential process, irreducible to deduction. 
2 Abduction by dualizing deduction 
2.1 Logic-based abduction  
To introduce the formal definitions concerning abduction, let us consider that 
  is a propositional language with the habitual connectives, and let   be defined as 
the classical logical consequence relation. We use capital Greek letters for sets of 
formulas and small Greek letters to denote formulas. 
 
Definition 1 (Abductive problem). Given    and   , we say 
( , )  is an abductive problem iff (if and only if):  
                                                                                             (1) 
                                                                                         (2) 
  
Definition 2 (Abductive solution).  Given the abductive problem ( , ) , 
   is an abductive solution for it iff:  
 ,                                                                                        (3) 
 ,                                                                                      (4) 
                                                                                             (5) 
 
According to definition 1, an abductive problem appears whenever there is a 
formula   such that neither it (1) nor its negation (2) can be derived by only the 
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background theory  . Then,   is an abductive solution if it extends the theory in a 
way such that now { }  entail   (3). Some authors demand only this condition, 
but following A. Aliseda (2006) we have included in definition 2 requirements (4) 
and (5) to ensure that   is not a trivial explanation. That is,   is consistent with the 
theory and it does not entail   by itself without the theory, so it is an explanation 
within the theory. With these strong requirements, abduction becomes an interesting 
non-monotonic inference very different from deduction. Additional conditions may be 
added. In fact, we will later concentrate on conjunctive minimal explanations, 
conjunctions of literals such that no proper subset of them is an abductive 
explanation. 
To mechanise the generation of abductive solutions, many calculi have been 
proposed. Most of them make abductive uses of deductive calculi by exploiting the 
equivalence of (3) with:   
    • ,     . This is done by most on the logic-based approaches 
coming from Artificial Intelligence (Kakas et al. 1998). Using the resolution calculus, 
the clausal form of { }   is obtained and then resolution is applied. Any dead 
end of the resolution tree can be taken as the negation of an abductive solution.  
    • , ,    . This is what the semantic tableaux approach does (Mayer 
et al., 1993). The tableaux of { }   is obtained and then a formula   which 
closes all the open branches is searched.  
In both approaches  , the negation of what is intended for explain, is in the 
starting point of the abductive search. So the abductive process starts by negating the 
empirical evidence which tries to explain. This is somehow similar to reductio ad 
absurdum, because the explanation   becomes an extension of   that makes 
impossible  . 
Proceeding in this way has moved logical abduction further away from the 
great expectations coming from Philosophy of Science. It is hardly believable that a 
logic of discovery proceeds by negating exactly what is trying to explain. It is not 
possible to take the above procedures as a logical model either of scientific or 
commonsense reasoning. 
2.2 The  -resolution calculus  
Definitions 1 and 2 restrict the scope of abductive reasoning. They do not seem 
to be appropriate to include «all the operations whereby theories are engendered», as 
Kapitan's comprehension thesis requires. Anyway, though reductive, those definitions 
can be understood as a scale model of (scientific) explanation. They comprise the 
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common features of any explanatory process. But to increase their interest a proper 
abductive calculus should be formulated. That is, a calculus which neither proceeds in 
an indirect way or assimilates explanation to reductio ad absurdum. 
That is what we have done with the  -resolution calculus. It is a 
reformulation of resolution which turns it an abductive calculus which generates 
explanations in a direct way. It works by using the equivalence between (3) and 
  , where   denotes the conjunction of its formulas. Now, the 
observation   is not negated, and we obtain directly abductive explanations, not their 
negations. Let us see an informal sketch of the process applied to an example of 
Kakas et al. (1998). Let rained , sprinkler , grass  and shoes  represent, 
respectively “rained last night”, “sprinkler was on”, “grass is wet” and “shoes are 
wet”. Then, the theory is:  
 rained grass  
 sprinkler grass  
 grass shoes  
We want the theory to explain that “shoes are wet”, that is:  
( ) ( ) ( )rained grass sprinkler grass grass shoes shoes                (6) 
If this is a valid formula, then the theory itself explains that the shoes are wet. 
Otherwise, the theory needs an additional support, that is, an abductive explanation. 
When is (6) true? A conditional is true when the antecedent is false or the consequent 
is true:  
(( ) ( ) ( ))rained grass sprinkler grass grass shoes shoes              (7) 
This sets the two possible extremes of an abductive process. We can refuse the 
theory if the observation contradicts it, or we can add the observation to our 
knowledge base, if there is no possible explanation within the theory. But 
Error! Reference source not found. is equivalent to:  
( ) ( ) ( )rained grass sprinkler grass grass shoes shoes                 (7) 
Any disjointed term in (7) is a formula which supports (6), by either 
contradicting the theory or assuming the observation. But, is there any intermediate 
alternative? Of course, these are the abductive explanations. For example, both 
( )grass shoes   and shoes  support (6). So, also grass  because, whenever it is 
true, one of ( )grass shoes   or shoes  is too, as a trivial semantic reasoning 
shows. So grass  is a possible explanation. It is not the best, as we can continue the 
abductive process, to explain why the grass is wet. From just obtained grass  and 
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( )rained grass  we get rained . Also, grass  and ( )sprinkler grass  
produce sprinkler . The three obtained explanations, grass , rained  and 
sprinkler  are abductive solutions. 
The previous example shows that  -resolution is in fact a dual version of 
resolution1. In the following, we introduce the most important definitions and results 
concerning propositional -resolution. Formal proofs can be found in (Soler-Toscano 
et al., 2006) and an extension to predicate logic in (Soler-Toscano et al., 2009). 
 
Definition 3. A  -clause   is a finite set of literals of  . Given a boolean 
valuation v , v   iff v  satisfies all the literals of  . The empty  -clause,  , is 
universally valid.  
 
Definition 4. A  -clausal form A  is a finite set of  -clauses. Given a 
boolean valuation v , v A  iff v  satisfies at least one  -clause of A . The empty 
 -clausal form is not satisfiable.  
 
It is possible to translate any formula to an equivalent  -clausal form by 
obtaining its disjunctive normal form. The following definition introduces two 
additional restrictions in the requirements of definition 2. We select only minimal 
conjunctions of literals. 
 
Definition 5 (Set of abductive  -clauses). Given the abductive problem 
( , ) , the set of abductive  -clauses ( , )bd   contains every  -clause   
such that:   
• The conjunction of the literals of   is an abductive solution for ( , ) .  
• There is no    such that ,    .  
 
Definition 6 ( -resolution rule). Given two  -clauses 1 { }   and 
2 { }   , the    -resolution rule produces their  -resolvent 1 2  :  
1 2
1 2
{ } { }     
   
Though this rule is presented with the same format that the standard resolution 
one, they are different since now we are working with  -clauses. In the standard 
                                                            
1 Dual versions of the resolution calculus are introduced in (Eder 1991) and (Ligeza 1993). We 
introduced the abductive possibilities of dual resolution in (Soler-Toscano et al. 2006). 
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resolution calculus (Robinson, 1965), every obtained clause is a logical consequence 
of the original set. Now, any  -clausal form which contains 1 { }   and 
2 { }    is a logical consequence of 1 2  , because any valuation v  which 
satisfies 1 2   satisfies   or  , so v  satisfies 1 { }   or 2 { }   . 
Then v  satisfies any  -clausal  form with 1 { }   and 2 { }   . 
 
Definition 7 (Proof by  -resolution). The  -clause   is provable by  -
resolution from the  -clausal form A , what we express with A   , iff there is a 
sequence of  -clauses such that:   
• Each  -clause in the sequence is either a member of A  or a  -resolvent of 
previous  -clauses.  
•   is the last  -clause of the sequence.  
 
In deductive logic, soundness and completeness results are important to prove 
the adequacy of a calculus. Now, these properties are related to abductive adequacy of 
dual resolution, that is, the  -resolution process produces every abductive solution, 
and just them. 
 
Theorem 8 (Soundness). For every  -clausal form A  and  -clause  , if 
A   , then A  .  
 
Theorem 9 (Completeness). If A  is an universally valid  -clausal form, 
then A   . 
 
The following theorem proves the abductive completeness of the  -resolution 
calculus, that is, all the  -clauses that satisfy Definition 5 can be proved by  -
resolution. 
 
Theorem 10 (Abductive Completeness). Let A  be the  -clausal form of 
p  . Then A    for each satisfiable  -clause   such that:   
•  .  
• For every '  , '   .  
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Definition 11 (Saturation). Given the  -clausal form A , the set saturation 
by  -resolution from A , that we represent as A , is the minimal set which contains 
every  -clause   such that   
•   is satisfiable.  
• A   .  
• There is not '   such that 'A   .  
 
Given a finite set of  -clauses A , A  can be obtained in a finite number of 
steps, by successive applications of the  -resolution rule, and eliminating subsumed2 
and contradictory  -clauses. 
The following is the fundamental theorem of the  -resolution calculus as it 
provides the right way for obtaining all abductive solutions by means of a  -
resolution process.  
 
Theorem 12 (Fundamental theorem). For a given abductive problem 
1({ , , }, )n   , if N  and O  are respectively the  -clausal forms of 
1( )n     and  , then  
     , =bd N O N O          
2.3 An abductive process 
By using only  -resolution operations, an abductive process can be defined, 
as it is implicit in Theorem 12. Given 1= { , , }n    and  , it follows four steps 
to determine whether ( , )  is an abductive problem and, in the affirmative case, to 
produce all of its abductive solutions: 
 
Step 1: Theory Analysis. Let N  be the  -clausal form of 
1( )n    . Then:  
 If N  does not contain any satisfiable  -clause, then   is universally valid, 
and the process stops, because in case ( , )  is an abductive problem it cannot have 
abductive solutions in the sense of definition 2.  
                                                            
2The  -clause   is subsumed by   iff   . 
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 Else, N   is obtained, and: 
o If N  , then   is not satisfiable, and the process stops, 
because ( , )  cannot be an abductive problem.  
o Else,  
 
Step 2: Observation Analysis. Let O  be the  -clausal form of  . Then:  
 If O  does not contain any satisfiable  -clause, then   is not 
satisfiable, and the process stops, because ( , )  cannot be an abductive problem.  
 Else, O  is obtained, and:  
o If O , then   is universally valid, and the process stops 
(as   , ( , )  is not an abductive problem).  
o Else,  
Step 3: Refutation Search. If for every  -clause O  there is a '    
such that ' N   , then   , and the process stops because the observation 
refutes the theory. Else,  
Step 4: Explanations Search. From N   and O
 , ( )N O    and then 
( )N O     are obtained. Then,  
 If ( )N O    , then    and the process stops.  
 Else, ( , )  is an abductive problem. The process returns: 
     , =bd N O N O          
Is there a logic of abduction? This is a recurrent question with a difficult 
answer. Abductive reasoning has a double character. It is a product, but also a 
process. Moreover, the process to obtain an explanation is maybe more interesting 
than the explanation itself. So, the answer cannot be affirmative if there is not 
something like an abductive logic which integrates abductive process and product. As 
we argued, traditional logic-based approaches obtain abductive products which fulfil 
definitions 1 and 2, but their processes can hardly be considered abductive, because of 
the abuse of deduction and reductio ad absurdum. 
However,  -resolution can be considered an abductive logic. Not only its 
products are correct (theorem 12), but also it is possible to define an abductive 
process which proceeds only by  -resolution operations, as we have just shown. The 
steps of this process can be connected with some ideas coming from the Philosophy 
of Science. As we show in the next section, it is possible to visualize this process in a 
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way that makes it very intuitive. So  -resolution agrees with common arguments for 
abductive logic. 
3. Abductive diagrams  
Peirce thinks that diagrammatic elements are fundamental in cognition in 
general and creativity in particular. So, it makes sense to look for a diagrammatic 
approach to abduction. In this section, we partly follow the ideas in (San Ginés, 
2011). She makes an original representation of propositional logic that allows her to 
visualize some inference rules. The system has an usability problem that makes 
difficult reasoning within a two dimensional sheet of paper: it requires a temporal 
dimension to represent material implication by means of colour-changing squares. 
But if we simplify the notation and change a little the semantics of the pictures, we 
can take the approach as a good representation for a sound and complete abductive 
calculus. In the original formulation, there is a pool of formulas that is interpreted as a 
conjunction. Now, we take the pool as a  -clausal form, so its elements ( -clauses) 
are interpreted in a disjunction.  
First, to represent some proposition we use a colour square. The colour is 
always the same for a given proposition. If the square is crossed out, it represents the 
negation of the proposition. As a  -clause is a set of literals, we join the squares that 
represent its literals. For example, if the blue square represents p, the green is q and 
the red one r, the following is a  -clause that represents p q r  : 
 
When several  -clauses are represented in a same pool, we interpret it as a 
disjunction, that is, a  -clausal form.  
The rules of the  -resolution calculus can be represented with these 
conventions. To do that, we first need a way for representing a general  -clause. We 
do it with a dark rectangle, that means some irrelevant set of literals. As an example, 
look at the following set of  -clauses: 
 
The first one represents some  -clause where a given literal is negated and 
the second one another  -clause where the same literal is affirmed. The literals in 
the dark boxes could be related or not. Note that, as the order of the literals is not 
relevant, the position of the red squares is arbitrary. And also the position of the  -
clauses, of course. 
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With these resources we can represent the  -resolution rule. Note that if the 
previous two  -clauses are in the same pool, they constitute two different 
explanations for a given abductive problem: one where the red proposition is affirmed 
and another one where is negated. Then the  -resolution rule allows us to propose a 
new possible explanation that does not use that proposition, as the following figure 
shows. Arrows indicate the direction of the inference. As it is an abductive inference 
it is the opposite direction to that of the logical consequence (look at the Soundness 
Theorem above).  
 
With these elements we can illustrate the  -resolution process with an 
example. We start with the  -clausal form that corresponds to the wet shoes example 
given at section 2.2. The following picture shows which colour we have chosen to 
represent each proposition. We have drawn explicitly a border to indicate that all  -
clauses belong to the same  -clausal form, so they are interpreted as a disjunction 




Look that there is a natural order in the derivation of new  -clauses. Number 
6 and 7 can only be generated after 5. This corresponds to the intuitive idea that 
“rained last night” (number 7) or “sprinkler was on” (6) are deeper explanations for 
the wet shoes than just that “the grass is wet” (5), which of course is also a possible 
explanation, but not so elaborated. It is easy to visualize the idea of greater reasoning 
chains in the diagram.  
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An accurate representation of the abductive process in section 2.3 would 
require two  -resolution processes (for the theory and the observation) that are 
originally separated (steps 1 and 2 of the abductive process) and then they join (steps 
3 and 4). One can imagine those breeding cages where birds are originally separated 
at the beginning of the courtship and only later they are put together. Both stages of 
the process are necessary for the success. Moreover, additional rules to eliminate 
contradictory or subsumed  -clauses can be represented within these diagrams: 
        
The left picture eliminates  -clauses that contain some literal and its 
complementary. In the same way, the right rule eliminates a  -clause whenever there 
is another one which is a proper subset. That is, the big one becomes subsumed, as 
there is another simpler explanation.  
With these rules, in the previous example,  -clauses 3, 2 and 1 are eliminated, 
respectively, when 5, 6 and 7 are generated. The old  -clauses become subsumed by 
the new ones. This represents the intuitive idea that some conflicting explanations are 
discarded, before solving an abductive problem, when a better hypothesis is 
formulated.  
As we have shown, all the resources in the  -resolution process can be 
represented by these diagrams. So we can use them as a sound and complete 
abductive calculus, which allows us to visualize many of the intuitive ideas about the 
formulation of hypotheses.  
4. Conclusions  
To conclude, let us evaluate the contributions of the  -resolution calculus and 
the proposed diagrams. The four Kapitan's theses draw the objectives that any 
systematisation of abductive reasoning should attain. These are high objectives which 
operate as the horizon of abduction. So, we finish this paper revisiting them and 
evaluating to what extent  -resolution satisfies them. 
First, the inferential thesis is completely fulfilled, as  -resolution is an 
inferential process, formally characterized, with important logical properties. 
The thesis of purpose highlights the double task of abduction: the generation 
of new hypotheses and the selection of the best ones for further examination. Many 
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approaches split these processes so first generate a number of hypotheses which 
satisfy (3) and then select, among them, those that satisfy (4) and (5). Usually, each 
process is performed in a different way. However,  -resolution integrates generation 
and selection, as the abductive process defined above shows. 
The comprehension thesis is the most interesting one and, at the same time, the 
most difficult to satisfy. The  -resolution calculus is far from including all the 
operations whereby theories are engendered. But the steps of the abductive process 
are related to some ideas from Philosophy of Science and Epistemology, as we have 
commented when showing the diagrammatic approach to abduction at section 3. 
Indeed, the  -resolution rule, in its graphical representation, can be interpreted 
within some cognitive theories, as Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Johnson-
Laird's mental models can be assimilated to sets of literals. Then, if 1 { }   and 
2 { }    are two mental models which explain a given observation, 1 2   is 
another mental model, maybe a smaller and better one, which also explains the 
observation. Some representations of mental models agree with our diagrams. Also, 
we underlined in the introduction the relevance of strategic rules for abductive 
reasoning. That relevance is shown explicitly in the diagrammatic representation, as 
an intelligent ordering of the applications of the  -resolution rule can lead to shorter 
paths to the best explanation. 
Finally, the autonomy thesis requires that abduction is irreducible to deduction 
and induction. Abduction is frequently called retroduction or backward deduction. A 
duality between deduction and abduction is often suggested. In this sense  -
resolution, which is dual to a typical deductive calculus, is somehow dual to 
deduction. But  -resolution is also irreducible to deduction. Classical deduction is a 
monotonic reasoning, while the abductive process by  -resolution, as it fulfils 











3 Details on the non-monotonicity of abduction can be found in (Aliseda, 2006). 
Fernando Soler Toscano 
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